FRONEMAN J relationship.5 The traditional link imposed by law was that the delict had to be performed by employees in the course and scope of their employment with the employer. The true justification for imposing this link is what makes the pedigree of vicarious liability ―uncertain‖. But the acknowledgment that it needs justification shows that its imposition is ultimately a normative issue. [94] The shorthand ‗course and scope‘ rule link, however, gave rise to two misleading assertions about vicarious liability. The first was that determining whether an employee‘s conduct fell within the course and scope of his employment was merely a question of fact, and the second was that the application of the course and scope rule thus invariably had to be treated as separate from the reasons or justification for the rule. The effect of these was to hide the deeply normative nature of the legal enquiry into the link between employee‘s conduct and the employment relationship in order to establish liability on the part of the employer. [95] The judgment in K exposed both these fallacies: ―The rationale for vicarious liability is to be found in a range of underlying principles. . . . Despite the policy-laden character of vicarious liability, our Courts have often asserted, though not without exception, that the common-law principles of vicarious liability are not to be confused with the reasons for them, and that their application remains a matter of fact. . . . Such an approach appears to be seeking to sterilise the 5 Atiyah Vicarious Liability in the Law of Torts (Butterworths, London 1967) at 3, defines vicarious liability in the law of tort as ―a liability imposed by the law upon a person as a result of (1) a tortious act or omission by another, (2) some relationship between the actual tortfeasor and the defendant whom it is sought to make liable, and (3) some connection between the tortious act or omission and that relationship.‖ (My emphasis.) 37