MOGOENG J [64] Accordingly, the employment of someone as a police official may rightly be equated to an invitation extended by the police service to the public to repose their trust in that employee. When a policeman abuses the trust placed in him by a vulnerable woman or girl-child, by raping her, a link may well be established between the employee‘s employment and the delict flowing from the rape. This was articulated as follows in K: ―In sum, the opportunity to commit the crime would not have arisen but for the trust the applicant placed in them because they were policemen, a trust which harmonises with the constitutional mandate of the police and the need to ensure that mandate is successfully fulfilled.‖ 46 [65] Counsel for the second amicus curiae submitted, correctly in my view, that for the purpose of vicarious liability, the focus on trust avoids the ‗on-duty-off-duty‘ debate that was central to the Supreme Court of Appeal judgments. Once we accept that our Constitution assures the public that it is safe to repose their trust in the police, we must also accept that that constitutional aspiration is undermined when that trust is breached. [66] Whenever a vulnerable woman or girl-child places her trust in a policeman on standby duty, and that policeman abuses that trust by raping her, he would be personally liable for damages arising from the rape.47 Additionally, if his employment as a policeman secured the trust the vulnerable person placed in him, and if his 46 Id at para 57. 47 These observations would generally apply to any kind of rape recognised in our law. They are now being confined to the rape of a woman or girl-child by a man because of the facts of this case. 25