FRONEMAN J common-law test for vicarious liability and purge it of any normative or social or economic considerations. . . . Denying that the principles bear such normative implications will only bedevil the exercise by rendering inarticulate premises that in a democracy committed to openness, responsiveness and accountability should be articulated.‖6 (Footnotes omitted.) [96] It was thus necessary to expose the normative character of vicarious liability before the state‘s delictual liability, in the light of the Constitution, could be developed further. The development in K was done upon an acceptance, for the purposes of the discussion in that judgment, that it was not a wrongfulness issue, 7 but one relating to the ‗sufficiently close connection‘ enquiry of vicarious liability.8 [97] It is understandable why the language of vicarious liability was used in K, because this was traditionally the sole basis upon which state delictual liability had been approached in our law until then.9 The delictual liability of the state is informed by the constitutional framework within which it operates. Prior to 1888 the position under the colonial framework was that of ‗the king can do no wrong‘. 10 That changed when ―Crown Liabilities‖ legislation was introduced in the various colonies, starting in 1888.11 On formation of the Union of South Africa the colonial legislation was 6 K above n 1 at paras 21-3. 7 Id at para 19. 8 Id at paras 32, 45 and 49. 9 See Baxter Administrative Law (Juta & Co Ltd, Cape Town 1984) at 624-9 and Wiechers Administrative Law (Butterworths, Durban 1985) at 315-26, for a critical discussion of the development of the vicarious liability of the state under that doctrine. 10 Baxter above n 9 at 622 and Binda v Colonial Government (1887) 5 SC 284 at 290. 11 Baxter above n 9 at 623. 38