MOGOENG J [37] The abuse of women and girl-children is rife in this country. The police service is constitutionally required to combat these, and other, crimes.21 This was aptly articulated in Carmichele: ―‗Sexual violence and the threat of sexual violence goes to the core of women‘s subordination in society. It is the single greatest threat to the self-determination of South African women.‘ . . . South Africa also has a duty under international law to prohibit all gender-based discrimination that has the effect or purpose of impairing the enjoyment by women of fundamental rights and freedoms and to take reasonable and appropriate measures to prevent the violation of those rights. The police is one of the primary agencies of the State responsible for the protection of the public in general and women and children in particular against the invasion of their fundamental rights by perpetrators of violent crime.‖22 (Footnote omitted.) This is a matter of great public interest. And it is in the interests of justice to explore the bounds of the test for vicarious liability laid down in K. This exercise should be undertaken to determine the state‘s liability in circumstances where a police official on standby duty deviates from his or her employer‘s constitutional obligation to protect the public and engages in conduct that constitutes ―the single greatest threat to the self-determination of South African women‖,23 namely rape. [38] In the light of the substantially different approaches of the majority and minority decisions in the Supreme Court of Appeal,24 it is necessary for this Court to address these issues. In addition, the applicant has reasonable prospects of success. 21 Section 205(3) of the Constitution. 22 Carmichele above n 20 at para 62. 23 Id. 24 SCA judgment above n 1. 14