some hours later. He recorded Exhibit A. He also recovered a box of matches Exhibit C, from the pocket of the appellant. The pieces of evidence proferred by PW4 are what the appellants stated in Exhibit A. The evidence of PW5 was no more than the recording of Exhibit D, which was a recapitulation of Exhibit A. The learned trial judge having appreciated the need to pass Exhibits A and D through the acid tests laid down in R. v. Sykes (supra) carried out the exercise extensively from pages 180 - 187, of the record of appeal. Therefore, I am satisfied that there were pieces of evidence by PW1, PW2 and PW4 outside the confessional statements in Exhibits A and D. Those pieces of evidence all go to show that the confessions are true, corroborated and the accused had the opportunity of committing the crime in question and the confession was clearly possible. Furthermore, the confessions in Exhibits A and D are consistent with other facts which were ascertained and established such as the bruises, burns and injuries found on the corpse of the deceased young girl. In all, with the attack on the deceased by the appellant, by physically beating her black and blue to submission; sexually assaulting her and setting her ablaze, it is reasonable to infer that the injuries and burns inflicted on her by the appellant, caused her death. Silas Sule v. The State (2009) 6 SCNJ 65. In the circumstances of this case, there is hardly any doubt that the appellant, by setting the deceased young girl ablaze, intended to cause her death or inflict on her, grievous bodily harm. So, the legal presumption is loudly to the effect that the appellant intended the natural and probable consequence of his actions on 5/4/2003. The test to be applied in such circumstances, is the objective one, to wit: the test of what a reasonable man would contemplate as the reasonable result of his actions. Arabamen v. The State (1992) 4 SC 35; Eric Uyo v. The Attorney-Gen. Bendel State (1986) 1 All NLR 106 at 112; Garba v. The State (2000) FWLR (pt. 24) 1448 at 1460. In Adegboyega Ibikunle v. The State (2007) 1 SCNJ 207; my Lord, Onu, JSC., succinctly stated: "If from the intentional act of injury committed, the probability of death resulting is high, the finding should be that the accused intended to cause death or injury sufficient in the ordinary cause of nature to cause death." I have no difficulty at all in agreeing with the learned trial judge when he concluded at page 188 of the record of appeal, to wit: