reasonable doubt, each and every listed ingredient of the offence. It is needless to emphasize that failure to prove any of the ingredients of the offence means failure to prove the charge even if the other ingredients are proved beyond shadow of doubt and ultimately, the accused will be entitled to a discharge and acquittal. See BELLO VS THE STATE (2012) 8 NWLR (PT. 1302) 207, 237; UTUK VS THE STATE (2010) 34 NWLR 171 AT 179; HARUNA VS A.G.(2012) 9 NWLR (PT. 1306) 419, 444 - 445 PARA G." Per WAMBAI, J.C.A. (Pp. 12-13, Paras. C-F) (...read in context) 17. EVIDENCE - WITHHOLDING EVIDENCE: The presumption of law as to withholding of evidence where a party in possession of material evidence in a case fails to produce it in Court "Again, the Appellant's learned Counsel forcefully argued that Exhibit A cannot be relied upon in the absence of the Appellant's first statement made at Bamaina Police Station, the first Station he was taken to, and that failure to tender that statement amounts to withholding of evidence and fatal to the conviction and sentence. His strength for this position are the cases of OLAYINKA VS THE STATE (Supra) and OGUDO VS THE STATE (Supra). In his evidence in Court the Appellant stated as confirmed by PW4, that he made a statement at the Bamaina Police Station where he was first taken to, which statement, PW4 admitted was in the case file but was not tendered in evidence. While the Appellant contends that the statement was not a confessional statement, PW4 contends it was a confessional statement. In OLAYINKA VS THE STATE (Supra) it was held that: "The statement of a defendant made to the Police, if not confessional, is the very foundation of his defence; hence the prosecution has a duty to make the said statement or statements available to the Court". ?On the other hand, as contended by PW4, if the statement was confessional, why was it not tendered though PW4 admitted that it was in the file? The issue then is whether the non-tendering of the statement is fatal to the prosecution's case as contended by the Appellant. The Appellant has invoked Section 167 (d) of the Evidence Act: By the said Section 167, the Court may presume the existence of any fact which it thinks likely to have happened, regard been had to common course of natural events, human conduct and public and private business, in their relationship to the facts of the particular case, and in particular the Court may presume that: (d) evidence which could be and is not produced would, if produced be unfavourable to the person who withholds it. It must be pointed out that there is a distinction between failure to call a witness and failure to call or adduce evidence. The Section deals with failure to call evidence and not failure to call a particular witness. See BELLO VS KASSIM (1969) NMLR 148, 152. Therefore, the rule in Section 167 (d) applies where a party fails to adduce evidence by withholding evidence which could have been but was