9 follows: ‘[T]he nature and range of any punishment, whether determinate or indeterminate, has to be founded in the common or statute law; the principle of legality nulla poena sine lege requires this.’ In other words the imposition of a sentence by a court must have its justification in either the common law or statute. In the absence of a provision that empowers the court to impose a sentence it is powerless to do so. This is not a new principle created by the Constitution. As long ago as 1924 the authors of the leading textbook on criminal law and procedure14 wrote: ‘The punishment to be inflicted for an offence must be of the nature and extent authorised by law.’ [9] The issue in the present case is whether our courts have power to impose a sentence for offences under the Act. That question is complicated by the fact that certain of those offences 15 are specifically referred to in Schedule 2 to Criminal Law Amendment Act 105 of 1997 (the minimum sentencing legislation). The court below thought that this resolved any problem related to those offences, but it is unclear whether that is correct, as the legislation merely provides for a minimum sentence, not a general power to impose a sentence for these offences. However, whatever the position in those cases, the offence constituted by s 5(1) of the Act and the bulk of the offences in chapters 2, 3 and 4 of the Act are not affected by the minimum sentencing legislation and raise in unadulterated form the fundamental question of whether the courts have any power to sentence offenders for these offences. The courts’ sentencing powers 14 Frederick G Gardner and Charles W H Lansdown South African Criminal Law and Procedure Vol 1 at 420. 15 Those constituted under ss 3, 4 17, 23, 20(1) and 26(1) of the Act.