NGCOBO J stage when the complainant is giving evidence, and it is plain from the wording of the subsection that the court has no discretion. However, once the complainant has given his or her evidence, the proceedings cease to be in camera. [139] If the parent or guardian of a child complainant wishes the proceedings to be in camera after the child complainant has testified, the parent or guardian must make a request under section 153(3). And as pointed out above, the court has a discretion whether to grant the request. In the case of a child witness, section 153(5) provides that the court may direct that the public be excluded from the proceedings. The subsection also contemplates that the presiding officer will act on his or her own initiative. This is probably what happened in the Phaswane matter, where the court, of its own accord, excluded the public from the proceedings. In the case of child witnesses, the court has a discretion. By contrast, in the case of a child accused, section 153(4) provides that the public must be excluded from the proceedings. The presiding officer has no discretion. [140] It is this differentiation between, on the one hand, child complainants and child witnesses and, on the other hand, a child accused, which the High Court found unconstitutional. It held that this differentiation is irrational and discriminates unfairly against child complainants and child witnesses. [141] It is not clear whether the High Court found these provisions to be inconsistent with the equal protection clause (section 9(1)) or the anti-discrimination clause 72