14 Navsa JA (Cachalia and Tshiqi JJA concurring) [34] I have had the benefit of reading the judgment of Dambuza JA and regret that I cannot agree with her reasoning and conclusion that the appeal against conviction should be dismissed. I shall in due course set out the relevant parts of the evidence I consider material. [35] At the outset, it is necessary to record that persons, especially children, who allege that they were the victims of a sexual offence, should be treated with care and consideration from the commencement of an investigation by the police and through the rigours of a trial. In Director of Public Prosecutions, Transvaal v Minister of Justice and Constitutional Development & others [2009] ZACC 8; 2009 (4) SA 222 (CC), the Constitutional Court said the following (para 74): ‘Courts are now obliged to give consideration to the effect that their decisions will have on the rights and interests of the child. The legal and judicial process must always be childsensitive.’ (footnotes omitted.) [36] Furthermore, in S v Jackson [1998] ZASCA 13; 1998 (1) SACR 470 (SCA), this court held (at 476e-f) that the cautionary rule in sexual assault cases is based on an irrational and outdated perception. It unjustly stereotypes complainants in sexual assault cases as particularly unreliable. It went on to say the following at 476e-g: ‘In our system of law, the burden is on the State to prove the guilt of an accused beyond reasonable doubt – no more and no less. The evidence in a particular case may call for a cautionary approach, but that is a far cry from the application of a general cautionary rule.’ [37] However, in the adjudication process, sight should not be lost of the fundamental principle of our law, that in a criminal trial the burden of proof rests on the prosecution to prove the accused’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. 5 Not one of the principles set out in this and the preceding paragraphs can be sacrificed. One must necessarily guard against being too readily critical of child witnesses and, at the same time, avoid too readily excusing material shortcomings in the State’s case. 5 See P J Schwikkard et al Principles of Evidence 3 ed (2009) at 558-559 for a useful, brief discussion for the underlying philosophy. See also s 35(3)(h) of the Constitution which sets out the presumption of innocence.