MOKGORO J based instead upon a “substantial body of opinion”,80 has been criticised as a cover for de facto deference to morality-based evaluations.81 Moreover, just as it is often culturally subordinated groups that in the United States bear the brunt of American obscenity regulation, 82 the manner in which Butler has been applied offers a cautionary tale regarding how well-intentioned legislation may be enforced in practice to suppress marginalised discourses that lack a powerful political constituency. 83 80 Butler, 8 C.R.R (2d) at 21. 81 E.g., Jodi Kernick, Suppressing Violent and Degrading Pornography, 19 Brooklyn Int’l L. J. 627 (1993) (arguing that Butler is morality-based, and will tend to perpetuate women’s inequality.) 82 See note 67, supra. 83 Various commentators have noted that, post- Butler, Canadian police and Customs officers seized quantities of lesbian, gay and feminist material. See Carlin Meyer, Sex, Sin, and Women’s Liberation, 72 Tex. L. Rev. 1097, 1119 (1994); Margaret McIntyre, 6 U.C.L.A. Women’s L.J. 189, 237 ff. (1995); cf. John Sopinka, Should Speech that Causes Harm be Free?, in Jane Duncan (ed.) Between Speech and Silence (1996), 140. Ironically, books by Andrea Dworkin, a prominent anti-pornography activist, have been amongst those seized. See Ursula Owen, Hate Speech and Pornography, in Duncan, op. cit., 39; Sarah Lyall, Canada's Morals Police: Serious Books at Risk?, N.Y. Times, Dec. 13, 1993; Mary Williams Walsh, Chill Hits Canada's Porn Law, L.A. Times, Sept. 6, 1993, at A1; Carl Wilson, Vol. 257, No. 22, The Nation 788, Dec. 27, 1993. The two Andrea Dworkin books seized, Pornography: Men Possessing Women (1989) and Women Hating (1974), were confiscated because they "illegally eroticized pain and bondage." Walsh, supra at A17. See also Hasnas, Back to the Future, 45 Duke L.J. 84, 120 (1995) (“the agents charged with the enforcement of [the statute upheld in Butler] apparently have a different interpretation of what is degrading, dehumanizing, and humiliating than either MacKinnon and Dworkin or the Justices of the Supreme Court”); Joanne Fedler, A Feminist Critique of Pornography, in Duncan, op. cit., 58 (noting that the Feminist Anti-Censorship task force opposed a MacKinnon-drafted anti-pornography ordinance in Indianapolis, asserting that the ordinance would erode women’s autonomy and privacy, because the ordinance would place powers “to censor and therefore to control culture . . . in the hands of the self-same gendered state officials.”) McIntyre quotes Catharine MacKinnon and Dworkin as acknowledging the overbroad application of post Butler obscenity law in Canada, and as asserting that this was the result of the use of criminal sanctions against pornography rather than (as they had advocated) provision for civil damages for victims of pornography. 6 U.C.L.A. Women’s L.J. 189, 239 & n. 188. See MacKinnon, Pornography Left and Right, 30 Harv. Civil Rights-Civil Liberties L. Rev. 143 (1995) (rejecting obscenity law as method of combatting pornography and calling for legislation making pornography civilly actionable. In American Booksellers Ass’n v Hudnut, 771 F.2d 323 (7th Cir. 1985), aff’d without opinion, 475 U.S. 1001 (1986), the court struck down the above-mentioned Indianapolis ordinance, drafted by Professor MacKinnon, creating a civil remedy against “graphically sexually explicit” portrayals of sexual violence against or sexual degradation of women. 27