been charged (see the Gambia Court of Appeal case of MOMODOU JALLOW v. COMMISSIONER OF POLICE (1960- 1993) GLR 39). Although the prosecution can do so by either direct or circumstantial evidence, the law requires that in either case the prosecution must prove the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubts (see the case WOOLMINGTON V DPP (1953) A.C. 462). From the foregoing, it clear that the prosecution must succeed on the strength of its own evidence and not allowed to rely on the weakness of the defence or lies told by the accused as the basis for a conviction. I have referred myself to the case MILLER v MINISTER OF PENSIONS [1947] 2 ALL ER 372, 373 and warned myself of what prove beyond reasonable doubts means. I have also referred myself to sections 179 and 180 (2) of the Evidence Act on the need of corroboration in sexual offence cases. I will now take the two counts starting with count two. With regards to count two (2); there is unchallenged evidence that the prosecutrix hired the services of the accused on that fateful date. There is also uncontroverted evidence that the prosecutrix had her cell phone (exhibit “A”) with her at the time she boarded the taxi. The evidence on record also shows that the phone was not given to the accused by prosecutrix. In his sworn evidence before this court PW2; the owner of the vehicle that was used by the accused on that date said he saw the accused with a new phone the following day and enquired. The accused informed him that he bought it. The accused did not tell him that it was left in the taxi by a troublesome passenger. The evidence of 6