30 the Constitution, we must declare these sections to be invalid to the extent of their inconsistency with the Constitution. The appropriate remedy [70] In terms of s 172(1)(b) of the Constitution, a court which has declared a statutory provision to be unconstitutional and hence invalid may make any order that is just and equitable, including ‘an order suspending the declaration of invalidity for any period and on any conditions, to allow the competent authority to correct the defect.’ [71] In a case such as the present, where a statutory provision creating a criminal offence is declared to be constitutionally invalid, the ‘general principle’ that ‘an order of invalidity should have no effect on cases which have been finalised prior to the date of the order of invalidity’ is particularly important (see S v Bhulwana; S v Gwadiso 1996 (1) SA 388 (CC) para 32). Furthermore, the order must be formulated in such a way that the interests of good government are properly taken into account. In the words of Ackermann J in National Coalition for Gay & Lesbian Equality v Minister of Justice 1999 (1) SA 6 (CC) para 94: ‘The interests of good government will always be an important consideration in deciding whether a proposed order under the 1996 Constitution is ‘‘just and equitable’’ for justice and equity must also be evaluated from the perspective of the State and the broad interests of society generally.’ [72] An order of constitutional invalidity which is retrospective without any qualification could easily have undesirable consequences that would seriously disrupt the criminal justice system. As in the National Coalition for Gay & Lesbian Equality v Minister of Justice case (supra), the least disruptive way of giving relief to persons in respect of past convictions for contraventions of ss 4(1)(b) and ss 14(3)(b) of the Sexual Offences Act is, in my view, through the established court structures: ‘On the strength of the order of constitutional invalidity, such persons could note an appeal against their convictions . . . where the period for noting such appeal has not yet expired or, where it has, could bring an application for condonation of the late noting of an appeal or the late application for leave to appeal to a Court of competent jurisdiction. In this way effective judicial control can be exercised. Although this might result in cases having to be reopened, it will in all probability not cause dislocation of the administration of justice of any moment.’ (Para 97)