Briefs of argument were filed after time was extended to do so had been granted. The appellant raised
two issues for determination; so also the respondent. The issues formulated by the appellant are:(a) Whether on the totality of the evidence adduced in the trial court, a case of rape has been
established against the appellant.
(b) Whether the learned trial Judge misplaced the onus of proof in a criminal case when she failed to
consider the failure of the doctor to examine the appellant.
The issues which the respondent's counsel framed for determination are:(i) Whether the evidence adduced by the prosecution established a case of rape against the appellant
beyond reasonable doubt.
(ii) Whether there are material contradictions in the case of the prosecution.
Appellant's arguments on the 1st issue centre around lack of corroboration.
It is the contention of Learned Counsel for the appellant that before the prosecution can secure a
conviction the evidence of the prosecutrix (victim of the rape) must be corroborated in some material
particular that sexual intercourse did take place and that it was without her consent and the
corroboration required is the evidence that implicates the accused in the commission of the offence. He
cited the case of Samba v. The State (1993) 6 NWLR (Pt. 300) 399 and section 179 (1) & (5) and section
183 Evidence Act in support of the argument. He contended that the legal proposition which postulates
that "there is no positive rule of law that says that corroboration is required in sexual offences but as a
matter of practice, the Judge warns himself that it is quite unsafe to convict an accused upon the
uncorroborated evidence of one witness" only applies where the victim is not below the age of 16 years.
In the instant case, where the victim is below the age of 13 years, corroboration is required as a matter
of law. Relying on Akpan v. State (1967) NMLR 185 which was cited with approval by the Supreme Court
in Shazali v. State (1988) 5 NWLR (pt. 93) 164, learned counsel submitted that corroboration is required
as a matter of law where a child whose evidence has been received even under oath is the accuser.
Contrasting the evidence of the prosecutrix with that of Irene Osagie on whether or not penetration was
established, learned counsel was of the view that the evidence of D.W.3 should be preferred and it is to
the effect that the prosecutrix ran to her and held her and said that one man wanted to rape her.
Turning to the issue of the non-examination of the appellant by the doctor, learned counsel contended
that if this had been done, it could have provided the necessary corroboration as to whether the
appellant had the same bacteria called 'styphilocus areas' and some yeast cells which were found in the
private part of the prosecutrix. Learned counsel next dwelt on the conflict and inconsistencies in the
prosecution's case which he said were material and should have been resolved in favour of the