(b) the person charged was by reason of intoxication insane temporarily or otherwise at the time of such act or omission. (3) Where the defence under the preceding subsection is established, then in a case falling under paragraph (a) thereof the accused person shall be discharged, and in a case falling under paragraph (b) of Sections 229 and 230 of the Criminal Procedure Law shall apply. (4) Intoxication shall be taken into account for the purpose of determination whether the person charged had formed any intention, specific or otherwise, in the absence of which he would not be guilty of the offence. (5) For the purposes of this section "intoxication" shall be deemed to include a state produced by narcotics or drugs." The locus classicus on the defence of drunkenness or intoxication seems to be Egbe Nkanu v. The State (1980) 3 -4 SC 1 where at page 18, my Lord Obaseki, JSC expounded the law thus: "What is "intoxication" in the legal sense? It is best described by its effects on the human sense of reasoning. It is "Defect of reason arising from Drunkenness" and three different effects are categorized. (1) Drunkenness may impair a man's power of perception so that he may not be able to foresee or measure the consequences of his actions as he would if he were sober. Nevertheless, the law does not allow him to set up self-induced want of perception as a defence. See section 29(2)(a) of the Criminal Code. Even if as the appellant alleged he did not appreciate that what he was doing was dangerous, nevertheless, if a reasonable man in his place who was not befuddled with drink would have appreciated it he is guilty. R. v. Meade (1919) 1.K.B. 895. D.P.P. v. Beard (1920) A.C. 479, Attorney-General for Northern Ireland v. Gallagher (1963) A.C 349 (per Lord Denning). 2. It may impair a man's power to judge between right and wrong so that he may do a thing when drunk which he would not dream of doing when sober. Though he does not realize that he is doing wrong nevertheless, he is not allowed by Section 29(2)(a) of the Criminal Code to set up his self induced want of moral sense as a defence. See also D.P.P. v. Beard (1920) A.C. at P. 506. (3) It may impair a man's power of self-control so that he may more readily give way to provocation, than if he were sober. Our law section 29(2)(a) Criminal Code does not afford his self-induced want of control as a defence." Furthermore his Lordship, Aniagolu JSC succinctly re-echored the law that,