16 period of time20 (see V v United Kingdom 30 E.H.R.R. 121 para 118). It would also conflict with the by now well-established sentencing principles of proportionality and individualisation (see S v Kwalase at 139 e-I; V v United Kingdom para 123 and 126). [23] From this point of view the approach adopted in Nkosi and Blaauw is preferable. I would however qualify what was said in those judgments by adding that the fact that the legislature has ordained the minimum sentences (S v Malgas 2001 (1) SACR 469 (SCA) para 25) must receive recognition in determining the actual sentence. So qualified, the reasoning in Blaauw and Nkosi in my view accords generally with internationally recognised trends and constitutionally acceptable principles relating to the sentencing of child offenders. Importantly it ensures that the duty remains on the prosecution – where it ought to in the case of child offenders – to persuade a sentencing court that the minimum sentence should be imposed. [24] To summarise: (a) The legislative scheme entails that the fact that an offender is under 18 although over 16 at the time of the offence automatically confers a discretion on the sentencing court which is without more free to depart from the prescribed minimum sentence. 20 Ann Skelton ‘Juvenile justice reform: children’s rights and responsibilities versus crime control’ in CJ Davel Children’s Rights in a Transitional Society (1999) 88 at 99-100.