III. Submissions in reply by counsel for the Respondents On the other hand, Respondents argue that the term “Bride Price” means different things in different cultures of Uganda such that the Constitutional Court cannot make a uniform interpretation of such a practice. A declaration of bride price as per se unconstitutional would neglect the numerous forms of bride price. For example, in Kinyankore customary marriages, frequently the bride price, or “enjugano,” takes the form of a gift from the groom to the bride. Moreover, such a gift is reciprocated from the bride to the groom (an “emihingiro”). It was contended by Mr. Kakuru that since payment of bride price is a customary practice that the Constitutional Court cannot decide the constitutionality of the alleged customary law of “bride price” before it is found to be applicable to a specific community. In the same vein, respondents contend that even where bride price is practiced, it manifests itself in different ways. Respondents do note that the practice of bride price, both the initial demand for a bride price and a demand for refund of bride price as a condition sine qua non of a valid dissolution of marriage, occurs among tribes such as the Japadhola, the Langi, and the Banyankole. However, to them “there is no such thing as ‘bride price’ in Kinyankole culture or the culture of the Japadhola or the Langi...” It was argued for 2nd respondent that “there is no culture in Uganda where a bride is sold or bought or where a married woman is not free and does not enjoy equal rights and protection of the Constitution and the law.” Additionally, Article 37 gives the right to “enjoy, practice, maintain and promote any culture, cultural institution…[and] tradition...in community with others.” Respondents argue that the requirement to pay dowry or bride price does not contravene the Constitution because the practice of “bride price or dowry” is “intended to show appreciation to a woman’s parents for taking care of the woman.” Moreover, if such a practice does lead to isolated cases of men treating their wives as mere property, such a perversion of the purpose of bride price does not negate the noble aims of the practice, let alone render the custom unconstitutional. As contended by respondent, those men and women that appreciate the positive goals of a bride price agreement should not be denied their constitutional right to enter into such arrangements. Bride price being declared per se unconstitutional would thus deny a man and a woman one legitimate way to get married, which wood contravene Article 33(1), which is a violation of the constitutional right to marry and begin a family. Furthermore, counsel submitted further that the requirement to pay bride price to the parents of the bride and the requirement for its refund at the dissolution of marriage does not contravene Article 31(1), (3). It was pointed out that the law permits and recognizes various types of marriages which are a reasonable alternative to customary marriage. In as far as parties intending to marry are adults who choose the option of undertaking a customary marriage fully knowing that it imposes these customary requirements, and do not undertake any other types of marriage which do not impose these customary requirements, they do in fact consent to the requirement for bride price and the refund thereof. As such, the said customs or practices do not interfere with the exercise of the free consent of the parties to the marriage as alleged. 7