The rules of how courts take judicial notice of any fact as laid out in the Evidence Act and the court decisions pronounced thereunder, should be techinicalities taken as technicalities other than as matters of substantive law. They should not, therefore, in appropriate cases, defeat the courts’ pursuit of substantive justice in strict obeyence of the commands of Article 126 (2) (e) of the Constitution. It is the duty of courts in this country to accept and recognize the view that under Article 126, (1) and2 (b) of the Constitution, customary law was constitutionally elevated from the inferior position the colonial judiciary had apparently relegated it to in comparison with the other laws, including common law as was known in the United Kingdom and as was applied to Uganda by the 1902 Uganda Order In Council. African Customary Law, under the traditional approach, was regarded as foreign law and apparently inferior to the other law of the land, hence the requirement of strict proof of the same under very strict rules. That positioning was most unfortunate. There was, in my opinion, no other law more legitimately applicable in Uganda than the various indigenous Customary Laws that were in place in the country before the advent of colonialism. Yet African Customary Law was not to be taken judicial notice of with the same laxity as was with the other law. The test was stricter for Customary Law than with any other law including English Common Law as applied to Uganda. That liberal test for other law other than Customary Law is stated in Halsbury’s laws of England 3rd Edition Vol 15 thus:“Judicial notice is taken of facts which are familiar to any judicial tribunal by virtue of their universal notoriety or regular recurrence in the ordinary course of nature or business. As judges must bring to the consideration of the questions they have to decide their knowledge of the common affairs of life, it is not necessary on the trial of any action to give formal evidence of matters with which men of ordinary intelligence are acquainted whether in general or in relation to natural phenomenon.” InR.V. Field JJ, Experte while [1895] 64 LTJ M.C.158. the court PerWILLS J.observed:“In the nature of things, no one in determining a case of this kind can discard his own particular knowledge of a subject of this kind. I might as well be asked to decide a question as to the sufficiency of an alpine rope without bringing my personal knowledge into play.” This, I believe, is what is referred to by my brother A. Twinomujuni JA in his judgment in this petition when he says:“However this court composed of Ugandans who were born, lived, worked and practiced law in this country during a period of over half a century should be able to take judicial notice of a notorious fact that the practice of bride price has caused untold suffering to thousands of women throughout Uganda………some of us have witnessed even worse experiences than the witnesses from Tororo.” (Sic) 42