(k) (l) (m) (n) customary marriage and demand of the refund thereof as condition precedent to a dissolution of a marriage, makes the woman commodity which lowers her dignity contrary to the demands of Article 33 (1) of the Constitution. Whether the demand for refund of “bride price” does not take into account the Constitution of the woman in the home contrary to Article (4) of the Constitution which demands that woman shall have equal opportunity with men. Whether the custom of “bride price” causes domestic violence so that the woman is subject to cruel and degrading treatment by the man who treats her as a commodity that must give total submission, contrary to Article 33 (1) of the Constitution. Whether the demand for “bride price” as a condition precedent to the burial of a bride dying before her husband has paid bride price is a custom repugnant to good conscience; or whether a person cannot be a husband when he has not paid bride price. Whether the custom of the demand for the refund of the bride price stifles the consent of the parties to the marriage to dissolve the same contrary to Article 33 (3) of the Constitution which demands that a marriage between a man and woman must be by their consent. Regarding issue (a) whether the petition disclosed issues for constitutional interpretation, it was pointed out for the respondents that it did not. It was contended that if the petitioners were aggrieved as they claimed they ought to have proceeded under article 50 for enforcement of their claims under the Constitution. For the petitioners it was argued that the petition revealed crucially important matters that bride-price as a cultural practice breached articles 2 (2), 21 (1), (2) & (3); 33 (1) and (3). This was in public interest. It is well settled that in order to invoke the powers of this Court under Article 137, as the petitioners have done “….. the petition must show on the face of it, that interpretation of a provision of the Constitution is required. It is not enough merely to allege that a constitutional provision has been violated” per Wambuzi C J.in Constitutional Appeal No. 2 of 1998, Ismael Serugo Vs Kampala City Council & Attorney General. The petition alleges that the act of payment of bride-price for prospective brides by their prospective grooms or their parents/guardians infringes Articles 2 (2), 21 (1), (2) & (3), 33 (1) & (3) of the Constitution for the various reasons therein stated. On the face of it, these allegations warrant constitutional interpretation, for whatever their worth. There is thus, prima-facie, a cause of action disclosed. I would allow issue (a). Turning to Issues (b) and (c) namely; Whether the payment of bride-price before marriage and its refund during divorce are (b) customs judicially noticed requiring no further proof, and 14