3 rape as charged. The evidence of DW2 points to the persistent denial of the allegation by the accused at the village level. At the end of the trial, both sides waived their rights to address me. Turning now to the substance of the matter before me, I must state that before the prosecution can secure a conviction of a section 121 offence, they must have established beyond reasonable doubts that: (a) there was carnal knowledge of the Prosecutrix, (b) the prosecutrix did not give her consent and, (c) the act was that of the accused person. The testimony of the prosecutrix is that the accused had carnal knowledge of her and without her consent. In THE STATE v. ERNES SANYANG (HC/323/09 of 15/12/2011- Unreported) and THE STATE v. SALIFU NJIE (HC/361/10 of 15/02/2012), this court dilated on the position of the law on corroboration as it relates to rape and other sexual offence cases under our laws where it was emphasized that section 180 (2) (a) of the Evidence Act, makes it statutorily mandatory for the Court to seek for corroboration of the evidence of the prosecutrix in sexual offence cases. While section 179 of the Evidence Act, qualifies corroboration as any evidence that tends to confirm the evidence of the prosecutrix on any material issue (R v. SEKUN & Ors (1941) 7 W ACA, 10), it has been held that such corroborating evidence must be extraneous to the evidence of the prosecutrix (R v. WHITE HEAD (1929) I.K.B 99, 102). There are two issues to be corroborated here; the act of sexual intercourse, and the element of consent or the lack of it.