54 [94] On appeal the appellant relied on this practice as constituting the living customary law that eschewed the requirements of consent and the prescript of age as determined in the RCMA. Counsel for the appellant submitted that the appellant had effectively entered into what he termed a “putative customary union.” [95] However, in our view, it cannot be countenanced that the practices associated with the aberrant form of ukuthwala could secure protection under our law. We cannot therefore, even on the rather precarious ground of the assertion by the appellant of a belief in the aberrant form of ukuthwala as constituting the “traditional” customs of his community, which led to a “putative customary marriage,”20 find that he had neither trafficked the complainant for sexual purposes (as defined) nor committed the rapes without the necessary intention. [96] We can furthermore find no fault with the trial court’s credibility findings, nor with its reasoning and conclusions in respect of the convictions on both the trafficking and rape counts. 20 Appellant’s heads of argument p 590 of the record para [38].