ZONDI AJ appreciation of the nature of these criminal acts, allegedly committed, between June 2012 and June 2015 and that it was only then that they instituted civil and criminal action against him. The DPP, however, declined to prosecute Mr Frankel on the ground that the right to prosecute him for the alleged offences had prescribed in terms of section 18. [9] The applicants thereafter approached the High Court and challenged the constitutionality of section 18 of the CPA. They sought, amongst other things, two main prayers. First, an order declaring that section 18 is inconsistent with the Constitution and invalid to the extent that it bars, in all circumstances, the right to institute a prosecution for all offences as contemplated by the Criminal Law (Sexual Offences and Related Matters) Amendment Act4 (SORMA) other than rape or compelled rape, after the lapse of a period of 20 years from the time when the offence was committed. Second, they sought an order directing the DPP to consider prosecuting Mr Frankel for the offences he was alleged to have committed. The applicants submitted that there is no rational basis for distinguishing rape or compelled rape from other forms of sexual offences. They contended that section 18 is irrational and arbitrary and therefore unconstitutional and invalid, in that the distinction it seeks to make is based on the perceived seriousness of the offences and their impact on the survivors. They further contended that it unjustifiably violates their rights to human dignity, equality and non-discrimination, to be protected from abuse as children, to be free from all forms of violence from both public, and private sources and access to courts. [10] Mr Frankel resisted the application contending, first, that the applicants had failed to establish the constitutional invalidity of section 18. Second, he contended that the applicants had not addressed the issue of retrospectivity in relation to the operation of the order of constitutional invalidity, as such order would necessarily operate retrospectively to allow the DPP to reconsider his or her decision not to prosecute him. 4 32 of 2007. 6