ZONDI AJ [48] The question whether a legislative provision is rationally related to a given governmental object entails an objective enquiry. The test is objective because otherwise a decision that, viewed objectively, is in fact irrational— ―might pass muster simply because the person who took it mistakenly and in good faith believed it to be rational. Such a conclusion would place form above substance and undermine an important constitutional principle.‖34 [49] The Minister, on whom the onus lies to justify the rationality of section 18, concedes that the exclusion of sexual offences (other than rape or compelled rape) from the definition of offences that do not prescribe in terms of section 18, was not informed by the government purposes underpinning SORMA. These are to: afford complainants of sexual offences the least traumatising protection the law can provide; introduce measures which seek to enable the relevant organs of state to give full effect to the Act; and combat and ultimately eradicate the high incidence of sexual offences committed in the Republic. The Minister points out that given the serious nature of all sexual offences and the vulnerability of survivors of such offences, any policy position that seeks to distinguish between penetrative and non-penetrative sexual offences in relation to section 18, cannot pass constitutional muster. [50] When rape or compelled rape was excluded from the reach of the prescription period of 20 years, this was not done for the purposes of protecting and advancing the interests of the survivors of sexual offences. [51] The primary rationale for differentiation between sexual offences in section 18 seems to be based on a consideration that certain sexual offences are more serious than others. This idea is seriously disputed by the WLC. It contends that there is no factual basis or policy reasons to endorse the view that penetrative sexual offences are more traumatic than non-penetrative sexual offences and the assumption that certain sexual 34 Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association of South Africa: In re Ex Parte President of the Republic of South Africa [2000] ZACC 1; 2000 (2) SA 674 (CC); 2000 (3) BCLR 241 (CC) at para 86. 21