SACHS J done in some countries, between regulating what is offensive and prohibiting what is harmful. Possession in the privacy of the home is treated in the same way as possession for purposes of sale. There is nothing to show any serious legislative attempt to achieve the difficult balance between the principles of free expression and privacy, on the one hand, and respect for equality and the dignity of all persons, on the other. Even if we accept that the slippery slope argument, according to which any attack on any form of speech is an assault on all free speech, is itself a slippery slope, down which important speech rights could tumble because of their equation with trivial ones, there is no recognition at all in the legislation of the specific importance of freedom of expression and of artistic creation. [111] As the historical and comparative materials assembled in Mokgoro J’s valuable judgment show, these are all highly complex and controversial issues, on which honest and constitutionallysensitive people may and do disagree. We are not called upon in the present case to say what our Constitution requires in respect of any of them, or with regard to their conjunctural invisibility; it is sufficient for the purposes of the present case to point out that the Act is irretrievably defective both by virtue of lack of legitimate definitional focus and because of absence of appropriate strategy to confront the broader problems of balancing different interests, in respect of which I have offered possible examples. [112] I accordingly associate myself with the basic reasoning contained in the judgments of both Mokgoro J and Didcott J, as far as they go. Indeed, I see them as complementing each other. The invasion of privacy can be regarded as reducing any possible justification for the violation of the right to free expression. At the same time, the infringement of privacy becomes harder to 61