however, solely and simply for the reasons which Langa J and I have given. Chaskalson P, Mahomed DP, Ackermann J, Kriegler J, Ngoepe J and O’Regan J concur in the judgment of Didcott J. [96] LANGA J: Applicants have been charged with possession of prohibited material.133 Two questions immediately arise. The first concerns the constitutionality of the provision creating the offence and that is the issue which has been referred to this Court for decision. The second relates to the nature of the material prohibited by the relevant section, the question being whether possession of some or all of it should be constitutionally protected. [97] With regard to the first question and having regard to the definition which is couched in very wide terms,134 I am satisfied that the prohibition as framed is unconstitutional. I am in respectful agreement with the reasons so succinctly expressed by Didcott J, more particularly that a ban on possession of the material hit by section 2(1) of the Act infringes the right to personal privacy guaranteed by section 13 of the Constitution. The terms of the provision, read with the definition, are unquestionably overbroad and have the effect of sanctioning the unwarranted and unjustifiable invasion of the right to personal privacy regardless of the nature of the material possessed. 133 In terms of s 2(1) of the Indecent or Obscene Photographic Matter Act 37 of 1967. The relevant part of this provision is reproduced in paragraph [9] of the judgment of Mokgoro J. 134 The definition of “indecent or obscene matter” is set out in s 1 which is quoted by Mokgoro J in paragraph [9] of the judgment. 54