MOKGORO J proscribes material representing traditional, classical and popular cultural expressions that form an integral part of constitutionally protected South African art and culture.115 Given what is clear about the objectives of the 1967 Act, that would not be a valid process of statutory interpretation, but an impermissible importation of content foreign to the enactment. The comments of Justice Sachs in Coetzee v Government of the Republic of South Africa; Matiso v. Commanding Officer, Port Elizabeth Prison, are directly apposite: It [is not] the function of the Court to fill in lacunae in statutes that might not have been visible or regarded as legally significant in the era when Parliamentary legislation could not be challenged, but which would become glaringly obvious in the age of constitutional rights; the requirement of reading down would not be authorisation for reading in. 116 [79] Even merely “reading down” so as to tailor the scope of the provision to fall within constitutionally permissible limits would present serious problems. There is a real danger that, in dealing thus with an overbroad statute, we will simply substitute for the vice of overbreadth the equally fatal infirmity of vagueness.117 The court’s reasoning in University of Cape Town v 115 Without commenting upon whether or not the formulae applied in various foreign jurisdiction would pass constitutional muster in South Africa, it is instructive that courts in Canada, the United States, Germany and India have insisted on exemptions for works of a bona fide artistic nature in pornography legislation. See R v Butler,[1992] 8 C.R.R. (2d) 1, 23 (“Even material which by itself offends community standards [will not be proscribed] if it is required for the serious treatment of a theme”); Miller v California, 413 U.S. 15, 24 (1973) (“the work, taken as a whole, [must] lack[ ] serious artistic, literary, political, or scientific value”); BVerfGE 83, 130 at 147-48 (holding that the constitutional right to artistic freedom must be taken into account even in the circumstance where material in question is unquestionably pornographic); K.A. Abbas v Union (1971) 2 S.C.R. 446, 471 (“artistic appeal or presentation of an episode robs it of its vulgarity and harm.”) It is interesting to note that the Hicklin test was modified in 1954, in R v Martin Secker Warburg Ltd., [1954] 1 W.L.R. 1138, Mr. Justice Stable held that a book representing an honest and serious attempt to portray the society or group about which it was written, rather than merely a vehicle for sexual episodes, could not be deemed obscene. But see note 67, supra, regarding the danger that judicial evaluations of artistic value will involve class-based and culturally discriminatory determinations. 116 1995 (10) BCLR 1382 (CC) 1114, para 62. See also Kauesa v Minister of Home Affairs 1995 (11) BCLR 1540 (NmS) 1558 (declining to “read in” limiting provision to overbroad regulation limiting freedom of expression, noting that this would entail the court performing “the constitutional function of the legislature.”) ( per Dumbutshena, J.) 117 Lawrence Tribe points out the perilous dialectic between the Scylla of overbreadth and the Charybdis of vagueness when he cautions that “[b]y pruning a statute of its overbroad sections, courts run the risk of leaving the 44