MOKGORO J the prohibition in section 2(1).113 If the crucial definition incorporated by reference in section 2(1) falls, then so too must section 2(1) itself. Reading Down [76] Turning to the possibility of saving the provision by “reading down” pursuant to section 35(2) of the Constitution, the same considerations that persuade me that the provision cannot be saved by severance also militate against saving it by such restrictive interpretation. Reading down is a narrower remedy than severance: it is appropriate only where the language of the provision will fairly bear the restricted reading. Otherwise, it amounts to naked judicial law-making. 114 [77] The overbreadth of the definition with which we are here concerned can scarcely be described as marginal. It is not as if we are confronted merely with a peripheral excess in scope, surrounding an identifiable proscriptive core that targets constitutionally unprotected material. Rather, the virtually unlimited range of unconstitutional potential application of the Act overwhelms whatever permissible proscription might be identified. [78] Any form of “reading down” will thus require substantial reconstruction of the section, including the interposition (“reading in”) of exemptions for undoubtedly constitutionally protected forms of expressions, such as artistic, scientific and medical works: the definition as written 113 See R. v Le Page, [1995] 28 C.R.R. (2d) 309 (Ont.) A provision in the Criminal Code permitting detention of mentally disturbed persons who posed a “significant threat to the safety of the public” was held to be unconstitutionally overbroad, in that it swept more broadly than potential violent or criminal conduct, failing to ensure that only those “who are shown to be risk to cause harm unacceptable to society” will be detained in a mental hospital. Id. 369-74. The court declined to sever the offending language because it was “central” to the review system. Id. 375. 114 See Hogg, Constitutional Law of Canada (3d) (1992), 393-34, para 15.7. 43