O’REGAN J and SACHS J [100] Because unlawful carnal intercourse is defined as carnal intercourse other than between husband and wife, any house or residence where people who are not husband and wife may go to have sexual intercourse could, technically speaking, be considered to be a brothel. If the definition were to be read in this fashion for the purposes of section 2, 3(b) and 3(c), the provisions would be overbroad and would constitute a clear infringement of rights of human dignity, freedom and privacy. [101] For the reasons given earlier in this judgment,54 however, it is our view that sections 2, 3(b) and (c) must be read to regulate only commercial sex. The provisions are, like section 20(1)(aA), reasonably capable of being read to regulate commercial sex only. Subsections 3(b) and (c) in effect render criminally liable a person who“manages” a brothel, or a person “who receives . . . moneys . . . taken in a brothel”. Both these provisions suggest that a brothel is a business or commercial enterprise whose business is concerned with sexual intercourse. In our view, because the subsections point to the business aspects of a brothel, they are capable of being read restrictively so as to criminalise only those engaged in managing or receiving money from brothels, being business premises for commercial sex. Section 2, however, is less clearly regulating the operation of a business when it speaks of “keeping a brothel”. However, once again, we think it is reasonably capable of being read to mean keeping a brothel for the purposes of commercial sex and should be construed in that narrow fashion to avoid the manifest unconstitutionality which would result should it be construed to prohibit any person who “keeps” 54 See para 99 above. 67