O’REGAN J and SACHS J conditions. We were not told of any society in which prostitution is regarded as a normal business activity just like any other, or a legitimate form of self-expression just like any other. Neither has any example been brought to our attention of international law or domestic constitutional law which has been used in any country successfully to challenge laws penalising prostitution on the grounds that such laws violated rights of autonomy or rights to pursue a livelihood. [94] The state argued that it chose to criminalise prostitution for a series of purposes – all of which are legitimate and important. The appellants argue that the method chosen by the state is not the most appropriate to achieve those purposes. It is, however, clear that the manner in which the parliamentary purposes can best be achieved is a matter where Parliament may choose from a wide range of reasonable options. In our view, it is not for this Court in such a case to decide which is the most effective manner in which Parliament can achieve its objectives. In circumstances where the limitation of a right is not severe, where Parliament has identified important purposes to be achieved by that limitation, and where people may reasonably disagree as to the most effective means for the achievement of those purposes, it is our view that it would be inappropriate for this Court to hold the limitation unjustifiable. We accordingly conclude that the limitation of privacy occasioned by section 20(1)(aA) is justifiable. The limitation of section 8(2) [95] Section 20(1)(aA), insofar as it renders criminal the conduct of the prostitute but not that of the client, constitutes a limitation of section 8(2) of the Constitution. In considering the justifiability of this limitation, we are not concerned with the justifiability of choosing to 64