O’REGAN J and SACHS J constitutional justification. [78] Counsel for the state, on the other hand, contended that the prohibition of sex work does not preclude prostitutes from giving expression to their sexuality but does impact on their receiving payment for sex. In this sense, the only interest for which a prostitute can claim protection is a commercial one, since her cluster of personality rights are not trenched upon. It is not the intimate expression of sexuality that is inhibited but only its commercial aspect. The prostitute makes her sexual services available to all and sundry for reward, depriving the sexual act of its intimate and private character. No invasion of privacy takes place at all. [79] Counsel for the appellants relied heavily on the jurisprudence of the United States Supreme Court which pioneered legal thinking in this area. Nevertheless, its jurisprudence on the question has to be handled with circumspection; there are differences in constitutional text and context.39 It is of interest to note that attempts to strike down anti-prostitution laws in the United States on the grounds of invasions of liberty or privacy have generally failed.40 The relationship of the prostitute and client simply do not fall within the range of those intimate human relationships that need to be secured against undue intrusion by the state. As Brennan J said in Roberts v United States Jaycees,41 only intimate and meaningful human relationships 39 See the discussion in Prinsloo v Van der Linde and Another 1997 (3) SA 1012 (CC); 1997 (6) BCLR 759 (CC) at paras 18-21. 40 Allen above n 35 at 173 states that “Numerous state and federal courts have denied that the constitutional privacy right recognized in landmark contraception, abortion, and sexual privacy cases starting with Griswold applies to commercial sex.” See, however, In re P 400 NYS 2d 455. 41 468 US 609 (1984). 51