O’REGAN J and SACHS J [59] The second question that arises then is whether the differentiation contained in section 20(1)(aA) is nevertheless discriminatory as contemplated by section 8(2) of the interim Constitution. It is clear that the ground for differentiation, between those who provide sex for reward as opposed to those who purchase it, is not a ground specified in section 8(2). However, the appellants and counsel for the Gender Commission argued that the differentiation discriminated indirectly on one such ground, namely, gender or sex. In support of the High Court’s finding of unfair discrimination, counsel for the Gender Commission referred to the case of Walker22 where Langa DP held that: “The inclusion of both direct and indirect discrimination within the ambit of the prohibition imposed by s 8(2) evinces a concern for the consequences rather than the form of conduct. It recognises that conduct which may appear to be neutral and non-discriminatory may nonetheless result in discrimination and, if it does, that it falls within the purview of s 8(2). The emphasis which this Court has placed on the impact of discrimination in deciding whether or not s 8(2) has been infringed is consistent with this concern.”23 Dealing with differential treatment of payment defaults by the Pretoria City Council, he went on to say: 22 Pretoria City Council v Walker 1998 (2) SA 363 (CC); 1998 (3) BCLR 257 (CC). 23 Id at para 31-2. 35