O’REGAN J and SACHS J purview of s 26(2) will be in breach of s 26.” [55] The Court thus expressly left open the question whether this right could be claimed only in respect of lawful economic activity. For the purposes of the present matter, we do not consider it necessary to resolve that question. On the first meaning, given that prostitution is clearly an unlawful economic activity, the appellants could not succeed. Once again, as in Lawrence, we are prepared to assume in favour of the appellants that the second meaning which confers a broader right is the proper meaning of section 26. On that approach, the state is not precluded from taking measures under section 26(2) of the Constitution “designed to promote the protection or the improvement of the quality of life”. The only proviso is that such measures be justifiable in an open and democratic society based on freedom and equality. In determining whether a particular measure is “designed to promote” one of the purposes of section 26(2), leeway must be afforded the Legislature to determine which measures will achieve the desired purposes. [56] The state argued that section 20(1)(aA) is aimed at improving the quality of life. In our view, whether one considers that prostitution should be tolerated, regulated or prohibited, there can be no doubt that it does have an impact on the quality of life. The Legislature is therefore entitled to take the steps it considers appropriate to regulate prostitution in terms of section 26(2) so long as it does not limit other fundamental rights in a way that would not be justifiable in an open and democratic society. As we shall see later, open and democratic societies adopt a variety of different ways of responding to prostitution, including outright prohibition.18 The 18 See paras 90-91 below. 32