O’REGAN J and SACHS J could have done so in appropriate language. [45] Counsel for the state argued that the broader interpretation of the section should be preferred because if the section criminalises both the conduct of the prostitute and the client, it would have no discriminatory effect. However, extending the definition of a crime, even to avoid what may otherwise constitute unfair discrimination, is something that a Court should only do, if ever, in exceptional circumstances. Where a criminal offence does result in unfair discrimination, there will generally be two ways in which the discrimination can be avoided – abolition of the criminal prohibition, on the one hand, and extension of its scope to the otherwise excluded class on the other. The choice between these is one which is ordinarily appropriate for the Legislature only. In the circumstances of the criminal prohibition in question here, it is peculiarly one for the Legislature, given the wide range of potential legislative responses to the social problems related to prostitution. There are many reasons why the Legislature may choose not to criminalise prostitution at all including the following: criminalisation of prostitution may be seen not adequately to deter prostitution; that criminalisation of prostitution may render the prostitute more a victim than a criminal; that there is a need to regulate prostitution to limit its social harm rather than prohibit it.11 [46] In the circumstances, we cannot accept that it is in accord with our constitutional values for an extended definition to be given to section 20(1)(aA). Indeed, in our respectful view, to do so would be contrary to constitutional values. First, it would be destructive of the principle of 11 See the discussion of these considerations by Wilson J in In re ss 193 and 195(1) of the Criminal Code (1990) 48 CRR 1 at 76. 25