"282(1) A man is said to commit rape who, save in the case referred to in Subsection (2), has sexual intercourse with a woman in any of the following circumstances(e) with or without her consent, when she is under fourteen years of age or of unsound mind." From the foregoing, PW1 is incapable of giving valid consent to any act of sexual intercourse under scrutiny pursuant to Section 283 of the Penal Code. It is sufficient under the law to convict the appellant on evidence that establishes sexual intercourse only between the two. Proof of PW1's consent being irrelevant is unnecessary. The finding of the trial Court at page 76 of the record and the lower Court's affirmation of the finding on the point at page 167 remain unassailable. The appellants added vehemence is that the penetration of his penis into PW1's vagina, easily the most important ingredient of the offence of rape, has not been established and the findings of the two Courts on that fact, therefore, is perverse. Furthermore, the evidence of PW1 on the vital ingredient of the offence if at all extant, the appellant contends, does not constitute sufficient proof of the crucial ingredient. Her testimony requires corroboration. Appellant's extra judicial confessional statement cannot, on the face of his plea of non-est-factum, it is further submitted, provide the required corroboration. Again, to some extent, the appellant is right. Section 209 (3) truly provides as follows:-