which is the creature of the legislature. It does not cover “any other law in force” that has come into existence by a of other means outside the realm of the legislature and certainly it does not cover a mere rule of practice that courts may wish to observe. To interpret the exception differently would bring into the picture all kinds of possibilities. For example, that even unwritten customary law, etc. may, legally, furnish an exception to the general rule in Section 132 of the Evidence Act. Court greatly doubts whether that was the intention of the legislature. From that standpoint alone, Court is of the opinion that the said rule is not legally justifiable, for it cannot stand as a valid exception to the general rule in section 132 of the Evidence Act, Secondly, and much more importantly, Court thinks that the above rule discriminates against women who are by far, the most frequent victims of sexual offences and is, therefore, inconsistent with Uganda’s international obligations under various conventions and the Constitution. The Collins English Dictionary and Thesaurus defines the word “discrimination” as follows, “The singling out of a particular person, group, etc. for special favour or disfavour...” The Convention on the Elimination of all forms of Discrimination Against Women (1979) (also known as CEDAW) provides a more elaborate definition of the word “discrimination” when applied in relation to women. Article I CEDAW provides as follows, “……discrimination against women” shall mean any distinction, exclusion or restriction made on the basis of sex which has the effect or purpose of impairing or nullifying the recognition, enjoyment or exercise by women irrespective of their marital status, on a basis of equality of men and women of human rights and fundamental freedoms in the political, economic, cultural, civil or any other field. The rule easily falls within the four walls of the above definitions. For clearly, its effect is to single out women for disfavour in cases involving sexual allegations in the sense that it nullifies the recognition, enjoyment or exercise of their rights to equality before the law and equal protection of the law, indeed, in such cases, the testimony of a victim is not, of itself, valuable. It is suspect; and this is, essentially, because she is a woman or a girl! (See Neville and 3 others-