O’REGAN J formulated a test for determining vicarious liability in such cases, which has since been applied in many cases. He reasoned as follows ─ “It seems clear that an act done by a servant solely for his own interests and purposes, although occasioned by his employment, may fall outside the course or scope of his employment, and that in deciding whether an act by the servant does so fall, some reference is to be made to the servant’s intention (cf Estate Van der Byl v Swanepoel 1927 AD 141 at 150). The test is in this regard subjective. On the other hand, if there is nevertheless a sufficiently close link between the servant’s acts for his own interests and purposes and the business of his master, the master may yet be liable. This is an objective test.”39 [32] The approach makes it clear that there are two questions to be asked. The first is whether the wrongful acts were done solely for the purposes of the employee. This question requires a subjective consideration of the employee’s state of mind and is a purely factual question. Even if it is answered in the affirmative, however, the employer may nevertheless be liable vicariously if the second question, an objective one, is answered affirmatively. That question is whether, even though the acts done have been done solely for the purpose of the employee, there is nevertheless a sufficiently close link between the employee’s acts for his own interests and the purposes and the business of the employer. This question does not raise purely factual questions, but mixed questions of fact and law. The questions of law it raises relate to 39 Id at 134C-E. Although Jansen JA’s judgment was criticised in a later case, especially insofar as it appeared to adopt “creation of risk” as a material factor relevant to the determination of vicarious liability (Ngobo above n 20 at 832B-D), its statement of the standard test cited in this paragraph was not directly criticised (see Japmoco above n 25 at para 11). Indeed, the Rabie test has been applied in many cases since Ngobo. See, for example, Minister van Veiligheid and Sekuriteit v Phoebus Apollo above n 28 at para 10; Japmoco above n 25 at para 11; ABSA above n 25 per Zulman JA at para 5; Minister of Safety and Security v Jordaan t/a Andre Jordaan Transport above n 28 at para 5. 23