in his statement (exhibit B) all these belie the assertion that he was insane. It is conceded that there was no motive established for the murder but it is trite law that mere absence of any evidence of motive for a crime is not a sufficient ground to infer mania: see Egbe Nkanu v. The State (1980) 3-4 SC. 1. The appellant in his testimony in court alleged that he did not know what he was doing at the time he slaughtered his brother. But the law is that evidence of insanity tendered by the accused himself is suspect and is not usually taken seriously: see Onyekwe v. The State (1988) 1 NWLR (Pt. 72) 565. In his evidence under crossexamination, P.W.3 the father of the appellant testified that a native doctor treated the appellant for mental disorder and that when there was no improvement he withdrew him and started treating him at home. Mere evidence that an accused person had mental disorder without showing that the disorder deprived the accused of the capacity to understand what he was doing and to know that he ought not to have done the act which is called in question is no satisfactory evidence of defence of insanity under the law. The evidence by the investigating police officer (PW.6) that the behaviour of the appellant was abnormal is of no moment because abnormal behaviour is not evidence of insanity: see Lamidi Salami v. The State (1984) 6 SC 357. The learned trial Judge also dealt with the defence of insane delusion under the second limb of section 28 of the Criminal Code supra. At p.35 of the record, he observed: "The story which the accused person had put forward is that he was in a dreamland, where someone was pursuing him and as he ran to hit something only to realize when his eyes became clear that he has stabbed the deceased. Specifically, his evidence on that point was: 'I did not know what I was doing when I stabbed my brother. I felt as I was in a dream with someone pursuing me and in running I hit someone on the way' Assuming for the sake of argument that the story he has told is true, it is my view that merely that someone was pursuing him when he did not show that his life was in danger could not justify his brutal attack on the deceased....." I am convinced that his reaction to the purported delusions is quite unjustified in the circumstances and therefore the defence under the second limb of section 28 of the criminal code is not available. But more importantly, it is my finding of fact that he found himself in a dream situation is but tissues of lies and I do not believe him. When matters were very fresh in his mind when arrested by the police, he said nothing about dream ..." I have no reason to disagree with that finding. The defence of insanity or insane delusion does not avail the appellant. There was no shred of evidence on record to establish that defence. With respect to the second issue for determination regarding the age of the appellant at the time of the commission of the offence, the contention of the appellant's counsel is that there were sufficient materials before the trial court which ought to have prompted it to conduct an enquiry into the actual age of the appellant at the relevant time. The issue raised is predicated on the provisions of sections 208 and 368(3) of the Criminal Procedure Law which enact as follows: "208 Where a person is before any court and it appears to the court that such person is an infant or a child, or a young person or an adult, the court may make due enquiry to