27 some cases. The general language used is only consistent with its applying to both common law and statutory crimes. The historical background is therefore inconsistent with the limitation of language for which counsel contended. [34] The next important contextual matter is the principle of legality and the need for the power to impose punishment and the extent of that power to be contained in a law. Section 276(1) recognises and embodies that principle in relation to common law crimes. There seems to be no reason why it should not also be taken to ensure that the principle is recognised and complied with in relation to any statutory crimes where the legislature has, for whatever reason, not incorporated a specific penalty provision in the statute creating the offence. An interpretation of the section in compliance with the principle of legality is constitutionally mandated.42 [35] It is also helpful to examine whether the restrictive interpretation counsel sought to place on the key words in s 276(1) has a sensible outcome. He accepted that they empower courts to impose sentences for the offences of assault with intent to do grievous bodily harm and common assault, which are the alternative crimes of which Mr Prins could have been charged and convicted on precisely the same factual allegations as the main offence under s 5(1) of the Act. This raised the following conundrum. Had the prosecutor included, in the alternative to the main charge under s 5(1) of the Act, an alternative charge of common assault based on precisely the same facts, no objection could have been made against that charge. The reason is that the magistrate would have been empowered by s 276(1) to impose an appropriate sentence for that 42 Section 39(2) of the Constitution.