22 it been, I have no doubt that a judge, as experienced as Blignault J, would have dealt with it and possibly the outcome of the case would have been different. Although there was some muted protestation on behalf of Mr Prins about the fact that in the high court reliance had not been placed on s 276 counsel accepted that the argument was one of law that can properly be raised before us. [27] Section 276(1) provides that: ‘Subject to the provisions of this Act and any other law and of the common law, the following sentences may be passed upon a person convicted of an offence …’. The sub-section goes on to specify imprisonment, periodical imprisonment, declaration as an habitual criminal, committal to an institution established by law, a fine, correctional supervision and imprisonment from which a person may be placed under correctional supervision, as permissible sentences. Sub-section (2) makes these powers in regard to sentence subject to other provisions requiring a court to impose a specific sentence or limiting its powers in regard to sentence or derogating from powers conferred under legislation to impose some other type of sentence or order a forfeiture in addition to any other punishment. [28] The State argued that s 276(1) is a general penalty provision empowering courts to impose sentences in all situations where there is no other provision in law prescribing the sentence that can be imposed for an offence.37 It contends that the section provides the legal foundation for the imposition of sentences in relation to common law crimes as well as statutory crimes, where no sentence is otherwise prescribed. Beyond that the precise scope of the court’s sentencing powers depend upon whether 37 E du Toit, F J de Jager, A Paizes, A St Q Skeen and S van der Merwe Commentary on the Criminal Procedure Act (loose-leaf) p28-9 (Service 47, 2011).