same way as foreign law and to require proof of its contents particular exception being taken by High court judges, particularly in Tanganyika during the late nineteen twenties and early nineteen thirties to magistrates who were also administrative officers making use of their knowledge of customary law without calling evidence to prove it” seeEvidence in East Africa by H.F.Morris No.24 at pages 112 to 113.” The Privy Council in Angu Vs Attah (1916) P.C 74 – 28, 43, in an appeal from the then Gold Coast clearly stated the attitude thus:“As is the case with all customary law, it has to be proved in the first instance by calling witnesses acquainted with the native custom until the particular customs have, by frequent proof in the courts, become so notorious that the courts will take judicial notice of them” The traditionalists would not even be willing to rely on guidance by African assessors even when one of the functions of such assessors was to advise the judge on matters of customary law. African judges as has been stated by H.F. Morris above, were not allowed to resort to their knowledge of their own Customary Law. In Ndenbera S/O Mwandawale 1947 14 EACA 85 the East African Court of appeal held:“the existence of native custom must be proved in evidence and must not be assumed from statements of the assessors or from the experience of the judge.” In R.V Gansambizi Wegonga [1948] 15 EACA 50, the East African Court of Appeal rejected a position that had been taken by a trial judge that since he had the assistance of assessors, it was not necessary to call a witness to give evidence in proof of a custom. The court stated“The legislatures of all the East African territories have been vague, perhaps intentionally so in defining or setting out [assessors] functions and until they are so defined it would be unsafe and impossible for the court to set them out in comprehensive certainty. All that can be said is that in the examination of the actual exercise by assessors of any functions, this court will always apply the test of what is fair to the accused person and will keep in mind the example of natural justice.” The levels of the caution exercised by those who believe in the traditional approach is clearly exercised by the court in Guzambizi Wesonga (Supra). In that case, a reference had been made to the Indian Evidence Act s.48 which provided:“When the court has to form an opinion as to the existence of any general custom or right, the opinions, as to the existence of such custom or right of persons who should be likely to know of its 33