46 Shilubana and Others v Nwamitwa 2009 (2) SA 66 (CC).15 [81] The court’s attention was also directed to the opinions expressed by Nhlapo and Inkosi Mahlangu, on which counsel on behalf of all the amici submitted that, in application of the factors outlined by Van Der Westhuizen J in Shilubana and Others (above), only the traditional form of ukuthwala could be recognized under our law. [82] Nhlapo argued that inasmuch as ukuthwala is no more than a portal, albeit an irregular one, to a marriage, the substantive minimum requirements prescribed by the RCMA must by necessary implication apply to the validity of ukuthwala. A version of ukuthwala that permitted a marriage to follow when these requirements were not met would not only be inconsistent with the Constitution but would also be inconsistent with the RCMA. In this regard the amici pointed out that the Constitutional Court in Mayelane v Ngwenyama and another (Women’s Legal Centre Trust and Others as amici curiae) 2013 (8) BCLR 918 (CC) has already held that consent, albeit in the context of a polygamous marriage, is a necessary requirement for a valid customary marriage, and the court remarked at paras [74], [75] and [83] as follows: 15 The third amicus curiae made extensive and helpful submissions on the position of children in the practice of ukuthwala, in the light of the provisions of the Children’s Act within the context of the constitutional directive of the protection and upholding “the best interest of the child”. They also referred the court to South Africa’s international law obligations with regard to the rights of children and comparative international case law.