45 the patriarchal nature of customary law, and in this regard referred to the remarks of Langa DCJ (as he then was) in the context of the customary law of succession in the matter of Bhe and others v Magistrate, Khayelitsha and Others (Commissioner for Gender Equality as Amicus Curiae) 2005 (1) SA 580 CC at para [78] in which he described customary law as “a system dominated by a deeply embedded patriarchy which reserved for women a position of subservience and subordination and in which they were regarded as perpetual minors...” They contended that there were echoes of such patriarchy even in the relatively benign form of ukuthwala described by Nhlapo. They submitted though, correctly in our view, that this was not a debate that this court was required to deal with in the appeal before us. [80] The Legal Resources Centre, who represented the fourth, fifth, sixth and seventh amici at the hearing of the appeal, presented argument on the status of customary law in South Africa with reference to the relevant provisions of the Constitution, and decisions of the Constitutional Court in the following matters: Gumede v President of the Republic of South Africa and Others 2009 (3) SA 152 (CC) at para [22]; Pilane and Another v Pilane and Another 2013 (4) BCLR 431 (CC); Bhe & Others v Khayelitsha Magistrate and Others 2005 (1) SA 580 (CC) at para [41]; Alexkor and Another v Richtersveld Community and Others 2004 (5) SA 460 (CC) at para [51]. For the determination of the content of customary law the court’s attention was directed to the process formulated by Van Der Westhuizen J in the matter of