MOKGORO J Minister of Education and Culture is apposite: If it is clear that the widest possible meaning was not intended, but at the same time it is not possible to say where the intended narrower meaning begins or ends, then no ascertainable meaning exists.118 [80] Finally, the fact that the fundamental right impinged by the statute is that of free expression weighs against reading it down; we must be sensitive to the danger that free expression will be “chilled” by uncertainty as to the surviving scope of the law.119 We must be especially solicitous of the rights of those in our grievously unequal society who lack the financial resources to risk testing the boundaries of their free expression rights through litigation. 120 I decline the invitation to leave undisturbed on our statute book a provision that is massively overbroad, in the hope that the fundamental right to free expression will be adequately protected by an assurance from this Court that, henceforth, the statute will be applied only to those forms of expression that lack constitutional protection. remainder impermissibly vague.” American Constitutional Law (1988) 1030. Tribe adds: “the Constitution does not, in and of itself, provide a bright enough line to guide primary conduct . . . a law whose reach into protected spheres is limited only by the background assurance that unconstitutional application will eventually be set aside is a law that will deter too much that is in fact protected.” Id. 1031. See also Stone, et. al., Constitutional Law (1986) 1045 (“By declaring overbroad laws unconstitutional on their face, the overbreadth doctrine avoids the vagueness that ordinarily would result from permitting such laws to be enforced up to the limits of their constitutionality.”) 118 1988 (3) SA 203 (C) 213. See also MAWU v State President of the Republic of South Africa 1986 (4) SA 358 (D) 370 (“I consider that [the challenged provision] is hopelessly uncertain, that no ascertainable meaning can be derived from it if it is meant to have some limitation and that if it is meant to have no limitation, if it is intended to apply literally . . . it has strayed way beyond the State President’s powers.”) (emphasis added). 119 See Osborne v Canada, [1991] 82 D.L.R. (4th) 321, 325 (noting danger of “cur[ing] over-inclusiveness on a case-by-case basis leaving the legislation in its pristine over-inclusive form outstanding on the books.”) (per Wilson, J., concurring); Roach, Constitutional Remedies in Canada (1995), para 14.220 (“reading down is not an appropriate means to advance the purposes of freedom of expression. The effect of such a remedy is to preserve on the books vague or overbroad legislation that could chill expression.”) 120 The deterrent to protected speech posed by an overbroad statute would not be effectively dealt with if “the contours of regulation would have to be hammered out case by case -- and tested only by those hardly enough to risk criminal prosecution to determine the proper scope of regulation.” Dombrowski v Pfister, 380 U.S. 479, 487 (1965) (per Brennan, J.) 45