MOKGORO J Severance [70] The leading test for severance under South African law was set forth in Johannesburg City Council v Chesterfield House (Pty) Ltd: [W]here it is possible to separate the good from the bad in a statute and the good is not dependent upon the bad, then that part of the statute which is good must be given effect to, provided that what remains carries out the main object of the statute . . . however, where the task of separation is so complicated as to be impracticable, the whole statute must be declared ultra vires.104 The Chesterfield test was cited with approval in Coetzee v Government of the Republic of South Africa; Matiso v Commanding Officer, Port Elizabeth Prison,105 and in Ferreira v Levin NO; Vryenhoek v Powell NO.106 [71] I do not think that the severance of one or two isolated words (lust, licentiousness) within the challenged definition is a viable option. 107 That is because the offending overbreadth cannot be laid at the door of any one word, or group of words, but rather permeates the entire text. Even the noun sexual intercourse, which is in itself fairly well cabined, when modified by the transitive verb forms depicting, displaying, exhibiting, manifesting, portraying or representing, becomes an uncontrollably broad concept, yielding a veritable kaleidoscope of potential referents. 104 1952 (3) SA 809 (A) 822. See also Government of the Republic of Namibia v Cultura 2000 1994 (1) (SA) 407 (NmS) 424 (applying Chesterfield test.) 105 1995 (10) BCLR 1382 (CC) 1392 (per Kriegler, J.) 106 1996 (1) BCLR 1 (CC) 78 ( per Ackermann, J.) In MAWU v State President of the Republic Of South Africa 1986 (4) SA 358 (D) 366, the Court noted that where a portion of subordinate legislation is void for uncertainty, it does not necessarily follow that everything surrounding it is also void: “The Court must try where it can and sever the good from the bad. It can sever the good from the bad when the bad is self-contained, stands on its own, can be cut out notionally as well as grammatically.” (Per Didcott J.) 107 The case of Brockett v Spokane Arcades, Inc., 472 U.S. 491 (1985), in which the Court severed the word “lust” while upholding the remainder of an anti-obscenity statute, is clearly distinguishable. Lawrence Tribe points out that Brockett presented the Court with a particularly “persuasive array of factors in favor of only partial invalidation”: “the law contained a plainly constitutional definition of obscenity in addition to the contested phrasing; it included a severability clause; and the state courts had not yet had the opportunity to construe the statute.” American Constitutional Law (1988), 1028. 40