O’REGAN J and SACHS J [115] We now turn to consider whether sections 2, 3(b) and (c) are inconsistent with the Constitution. In considering this question, we will adopt the narrow interpretation of sections 2, 3(b) and (c) discussed above.72 The appellants’ key arguments in asserting that these provisions are unconstitutional were based first on section 26 of the interim Constitution, and secondly on the fact, as they alleged, that it is safer for prostitutes to work from brothels, rather than from the street, or on their own. [116] To the extent that we have held that section 20(1)(aA) does not constitute a limitation of section 26, the same reasoning applies to sections 2, 3(b) and (c). If criminalising prostitution itself has been accepted in open and democratic societies as promoting the quality of life, so too has criminalising brothels. Indeed, the suppression of brothels has far greater acceptance than the criminalisation of prostitution. Though such suppression is by no means universal, the common theme is that in open and democratic societies the question is regarded as essentially one of legislative choice. For the reasons given above in relation to section 20(1)(aA), therefore, this argument must fail. [117] The second argument of counsel for the appellants was that if section 20(1)(aA) unjustifiably invaded fundamental rights to personal autonomy, then criminal sanctions on the activity of brothel-keeping could similarly not be justified. To the extent, however, that we have found that the limitations on privacy occasioned by section 20(1)(aA) are justified, once again any such limitations are also justified in respect of sections 2 and 3(b) and (c). 72 See para 101 above. 79