O’REGAN J and SACHS J criminalise prostitution per se, as we were when considering the section 13 limitation. We are here concerned with the justifiability of the decision to criminalise primarily the conduct of the prostitute. It is the difference between the treatment of patrons and prostitutes that causes the constitutional complaint; and it is that unfair, discriminatory treatment which must be justified. [96] It is not clear why the state should criminalise primarily the conduct of the prostitute and not that of the client. It is clear that the overall purpose of criminalising prostitution is to curtail the extent of prostitution. However, that purpose may be far more effectively achieved were the client’s conduct to be rendered criminal in the same way and were customers to be prosecuted as a matter of course. The state did not seek to argue that there was a legitimate purpose for criminalising primarily the conduct of the prostitute as a matter of law, but exclusively as a matter of practice. For the reasons already advanced we do not share the view of Ngcobo J that, in this area, with its strongly gendered context, the state is justified in targeting the alleged supplier of the sexual service and not the consumer. [97] As we have observed, democratic societies adopt a range of responses to prostitution. Wherever the conduct of prostitutes is treated as the primary criminal offence, it seems to us that patterns of gender inequality and illegitimate double standards relating to male and female sexuality will be reinforced. In our constitutional democracy which is committed to gender equality, a criminal prohibition which has the effect of furthering patterns of gender inequality will need powerful justification to meet the test of section 33. [98] In the light of the fact that the state did not seek to argue that there was an important 65