O’REGAN J and SACHS J [124] Counsel for the appellants, on the other hand, contended that such suspension would be neither just nor equitable nor practically necessary, whether viewed from the point of view of the interests of the sex worker or from the point of view of the interests of society generally. From the point of view of the sex worker, there is no reason why a delay is necessary to protect her interests or the interests of the group as a whole. Indeed, any delay in suspension simply denies the sex worker access to the protection of the laws already in place. An order striking down section 20(1)(aA) with immediate effect would do much to ameliorate the adverse conditions presently affecting sex workers in the same industry. The longer the delay in lifting the criminal sanction, the longer sex workers suffer the harms associated with it. Only when the criminal sanction is removed can the associated stigma and violence be mitigated. Counsel for the amici took a similar position, arguing that there were no cogent reasons as to why a declaration of invalidity should be suspended. [125] In our view, the above arguments do not give sufficient weight to the fact that the invalidity of the section stems not from unjustifiable limitation of a fundamental right to privacy, but from the discriminatory impact of a prohibition which the Legislature may validly impose. It would accordingly be premature for prostitutes to embark on a process of attempting to normalise their work in a decriminalised atmosphere. Although decriminalisation is a valid option for Parliament, it is not one which is constitutionally required. All that is required of Parliament is that if it chooses to criminalise prostitution it may not do so in an unfairly discriminatory fashion. At the same time we cannot accept the state argument that invalidation of the section would lead to chaos. It would in fact simply restore the position as it had long existed in South Africa prior to 1988, and as still prevails in much of the Commonwealth today: 83