O’REGAN J and SACHS J Ad Hoc Committee of the President’s Council on the Immorality Act.58 [103] The challenge accordingly was based on two propositions: the state has no business enforcing private morality, and the purpose of the Act, as made manifest by its authors, is precisely to defend a particular concept of morality. We will consider each of these in turn. [104] All open and democratic societies are confronted with the need to determine the scope for pluralist tolerance of unpopular forms of behaviour. To posit a pluralist constitutional democracy that is tolerant of different forms of conduct is not, however, to presuppose one without morality or without a point of view. A pluralist constitutional democracy does not banish concepts of right and wrong, nor envisage a world without good and evil. It is impartial in its dealings with people and groups, but it is not neutral in its value system. Our Constitution certainly does not debar the state from enforcing morality. Indeed, the Bill of Rights is nothing if not a document founded on deep civic morality. As this Court held in Carmichele v Minister of Safety and Security and Another 2001 (4) SA 938 (CC); 2001 (10) BCLR 995 (CC): 58 Report of the Ad Hoc Committee of the President’s Council on the Immorality Act (Act 23 of 1957) (14 August 1985). See House of Delegates Debates, 6 October 1987, Colls 3843-3861; House of Representatives Debates, 7 October 1987, Colls 3423-3433; and House of Assemblies Debates, 15 February 1988, Colls 884-899. 69