O’REGAN J and SACHS J justification. However, to suggest that male patrons who are able to use their economic means to obtain sexual gratification are somehow the less blameworthy partners in the eyes of the criminal law, appears to us to be markedly unfair. [69] Parliament may decide to render criminal sexual intercourse where a reward is paid, but their decision to make only purveyors of sexual intercourse and not purchasers primarily liable, entrenches the deep patterns of gender inequality which exist in our society and which our Constitution is committed to eradicating. In this regard, section 20(1)(aA) is different from the presidential pardon at issue in Hugo’s case,26 which afforded a benefit to single mothers of children, admittedly on the stereotyped basis that it is mothers who bear the primary responsibility for children in our society.27 In that case, we held that because the impact was to reduce the burden borne by mothers, it did not constitute unfair discrimination. In this case, the impact exacerbates the burden of sexual stereotyping borne by women and in particular sex workers. [70] In determining whether the discrimination is unfair, we pay particular regard to the affidavits and argument of the Gender Commission. It is their constitutional mandate to protect, develop, promote respect for and attain gender equality.28 This Court is of course not bound by the Commission’s views but it should acknowledge its special constitutional role and its expertise. In the circumstances, its evidence and argument that section 20(1)(aA) is unfairly 26 Above n 16. 27 Id at para 47. 42