intelligence to justify the receipt of his evidence and understands the duty of speaking the truth. See Section 182(1) and (2) of the Evidence Act (supra). The Supreme Court interpreted the provisions of Sections 154 and 182(1) and (2) of the Evidence Act (supra) in the case of OKON v. STATE (1988) 19 NSCC 156. In DAGAYYA v. THE STATE (2006) All FWLR (Pt.308) 1212 at pages 1232 - 1233 the Supreme Court per Tobi, JSC reiterated or echoed the position in Okon's case thus:"As correctly pointed out by learned counsel for the respondent this court dealt with the matter in 1988 in the case of Okon v. State (supra) ........This court held that: (1) Once a witness is a child, by the combined effect of Sections 154 and 182(1) and (2) of the Evidence Act, the first duty of the court is to determine first of all whether the child is sufficiently intelligent to understand the questions he may be asked in the course of his testimony and to be able to answer rationally. This is tested by the court putting on (sic) him preliminary questions which may have nothing to do with the matter before the court. (2) If, as a result of these preliminary questions, the court comes to the conclusion that the child is unable to understand the questions or answer them intelligently, then the child is not a competent witness within the meaning of Section 154(1). But if the child passes this preliminary test, then the court must proceed to the next test as to whether, in the opinion of the court, the child is able to understand the nature and implication of an oath. (3) If after passing the first test, he fails this second test, then being a competent witness, he will give evidence which is admissible under Section 182(2), though not on oath. If, on the other hand, he passes the second test so that, in the opinion of the court, he understands the nature of an oath, he will give evidence on oath. In Mbele v. State, supra, this court followed the above decision in Okon. This court went further and held that once there are clear indications in the record of proceedings that a trial court carried out the preliminary investigation envisaged by Sections 154 and 182 of the Evidence Act before taking the evidence of a child or infant, that would mean at least prima facie, that the said inquiry was carried out even though the actual questions and answers in the course of the investigation are not recorded. It will then be opened to a party contending that the requisite investigation was not carried out to rebut his prima facie opinion by showing either that there was no investigation at all or what the trial Judge called an investigation under Sections 154 and 182 was a parody or travesty of the investigation envisaged." Courts do not give decisions for the fun of it. Decisions in cases, aside from binding parties thereto as well as their privies, are also to guide other persons who might find themselves in similar circumstances as the parties in any given decided case. The Appellant in my considered view ought to have been