NWLR (Pt. 72) 565; R. v. Inyang (1946) 12 WACA 5; R. v. Ashigifuwo (1948) 12 WACA 389. It was pointed out that the learned trial Judge relied heavily on the report (exhibit A) of the consultant psychiatrist Dr. Malomo (P.W.5) in coming to the conclusion that the appellant was not insane. Learned counsel argued that the evidence of P.W.5 to the effect that the appellant did not suffer from insanity or insane delusion ought not to have been treated as conclusive on the issue since he, P.W.5 did not examine the appellant immediately before or after the incident. It was further stressed that the examination of the appellant by P.W.5 was conducted in April 1988 that is, one year and two months after the offence was committed and therefore, not relevant in determining the mental condition of the appellant at the material time. In response, learned counsel for the respondent referred to the statement (exhibit B) made by the appellant on 5th of February, 1987 the day the offence in question was committed and submitted that the appellant was fully in charge of himself. He argued that the appellant knew that what he was doing was wrong and that was why he ran away to a nearby village after killing the deceased. The defence of insanity under section 28 of the Criminal Code of Bendel State does not avail the appellant, learned counsel submitted relying on the following authorities: Ejinima v. State (1991) 6 NWLR (Pt. 200) 627; Dim v. R. (1952) 14 WACA 154; R. v. Omoni (1949) 12 WACA 511; Kure v. The State (1988) 1 NWLR (Pt. 71) 404, and Sanusi v. The State (1984) 10 SC 166. It needs to be emphasized that the defence of insanity being canvassed for the appellant in this court is incompetent, since the defence was not raised in the court below. It is not competent for an appellant who raised an issue at the trial court, abandoned that issue at the Court of Appeal and only to take it up again in this court. Constitutionally, this court is enjoined to hear appeals from decisions of the Court of Appeal. It has no jurisdiction to entertain appeals directly from decisions of High Courts and in this regard it is apposite to refer to section 213(1) of the 1979 Constitution, now section 233(1) of the 1999 Constitution, Ogoyi v. Umagba (1995) 9 NWLR (Pt. 419) 283; Harriman v. Harriman (1987) 3 NWLR (Pt. 60) 244. For the appellant to canvass before this court the defence of insanity which was raised at the trial court but abandoned in the Court of Appeal is tantamount to an appeal on an issue directly from the decision of the High Court to the Supreme Court which on the authorities referred to above is objectionable unless upon leave to argue it as a new issue. However, since no objection thereto was raised by any of the parties in this appeal, and having regard to the nature of the appeal involving life and death, I am prepared, for what it is worth, to hazard an opinion on the appellant's defence under consideration. In considering whether the defence of insanity avails the appellant, it is well to bear in mind that there is a general presumption that every person is sane until the contrary is proved. In this connection, section 27 of the Criminal Code Law of Bendel state applicable in Edo State provides that everyone is presumed to be of sound mind and to have been of sound mind at the time he committed the offence charged: see Onakpoya v. The Queen (1959) NSCC 130, (1959) SCNLR 384. Therefore, an accused person who pleads insanity as a defence to an offence with which he is charged has the burden of proving that he was suffering from insanity or insane delusion at the time the offence with which he was charged was committed. The burden of proof on the accused is on the balance of probability or preponderance of evidence and not on the basis of proof beyond reasonable doubt: see Daniel Madjemu v. State (2001) 9 NWLR (Pt. 718) 349. It must also be borne in mind that it is not every form of mental disorder that can relieve an accused person from criminal responsibility. The law requires that such mental disorder that can avail an accused person as a defence must fall within the ambit of section 28 of the Criminal Code Law supra which provides: